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Out of interest who was Counsel, as to me it seems like they didn't make a very good job of pleading the case. To argue the prerogative you have to have at least a QCgeoffsinclair wrote:R (on the application of Ooi and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
"In the instant case, none of the claimants' bases of challenge were made out. Neither of the rule changes had impaired an existing right or created a new obligation in regard to events that had already passed. As at the date of the changes, none of the claimants had had a right to be granted ILR in the light of the fact that in no single case had four years of continuous residence been achieved.
In that event, the amended rules could not be criticised for having retrospective effect. Moreover, the introduction of the knowledge requirement could not be challenged on the ground that it had been based on a purpose of effecting 'social cohension' which was not within the scope of s 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. Further, there had been no explicit statement to any of the claimants that they would have become eligible to apply for ILR after residing for four years in the UK.
In addition, no direct or indirect discrimination could be said to have been caused to the claimants under any of the provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976, and there had been no violations of the claimants' Convention rights. Finally, the Secretary of State could not be criticised for not having exercised his prerogative powers, given that none of the claimants had at the time of their applications, asked for such powers to be exercised, and in any event, the fact that the powers had not been exercised could not be regarded as Wednesbury unreasonable or perverse."
They (claimant) got slammed - not so sure the Court sufficiently addressed the breach of Convention Rights under Article 8(2) ECHR, right to respect for home and private life. The Home Office was roundly lambasted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Court would have had this report available. I shall await the conclusion of VBSI and their lawyers who know the case best.
'no single case had four years of continuous residence been achieved' is not true. I did complete 4 years and when I phoned home office I was told that I will have to complete 5 years.tensailee wrote:*R (on the application of Ooi and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 279 (Dec)
Hearing Date: 18 December 2007
Court: Queen's Bench Division, Administrative Court
Judge: Mitting J
Representation: Ramby De Mello and Danny Bazini (instructed by Harvey Son & Filby) for the claimants. Jonathan Moffett (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) for the Secretary of State.
Abstract:
Immigration - Leave to enter. The amendments made to para 134 of the Immigration Rules, which increased the period by which a work permit holder could become eligible to apply for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom from four years to five years, and which required an applicant to pass a test in respect of 'knowledge of life in the UK' in addition to the existing requirement for a 'sufficient understanding of English', were lawful.
Catchwords:
Immigration – Leave to enter – Non-patrial – Right of entry – Claimants applying for indefinite leave to remain – Secretary of State refusing applications given changes to immigration rules – Whether changes to rules unlawful – Correctness of Secretary of State's decisions – Immigration Act 1971, s 3(2) – Race Relations Act 1976 – Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Pt 1, arts 8, 14, First Protocol, art 1 – Immigration Rules HC 395, para 134 (i), as amended.
Summary:
Section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971, so far as material, provides: '(2) The Secretary of State shall from time to time (and as soon as may be) lay before Parliament statements of the rules, or of any changes in the rules, laid down by him as to the practice to be followed in the administration of this Act for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons required by this Act to have leave to enter, including any rules as to the period for which leave is to be given and the conditions to be attached in different circumstances; and section 1(4) above shall not be taken to require uniform provision to be made by the rules as regards admission of persons for a purpose or in a capacity specified in section 1(4) (and in particular, for this as well as other purposes of this Act, account may be taken of citizenship or nationality)...'
On 3 April 2006, para 134 (i) of HC 395 (the Immigration Rules) was amended so that the period by which a work permit holder could become eligible to apply for indefinite leave to remain (ILR) in the United Kingdom increased from four years to five years. Then, on 2 April 2007, a new sub-paragraph to para 134 of the Immigration Rules came into effect. The new rule required, for the purposes of a successful application for ILR, an applicant to demonstrate: first, 'a sufficient understanding of English'; and secondly, 'knowledge of life in the UK' (the knowledge requirement). On various dates after those new rules had come into effect, the defendant Secretary of State refused ILR applications which had been made by five claimants, all of whom were men of chinese extraction, who had been granted permits to work as chefs for UK based employers. The claimants each applied for permission to apply for judicial review of the lawfulness of the two sets of rule changes and the decisions that the Secretary of State had made under them in their respective cases.
Their challenge was brought on six alternative bases: (i) that the rule changes were ultra vires in respect of s 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, as they had had a retrospective effect; (ii) that the knowledge requirement was ultra vires as it had been intended to achieve social cohesion which was not within the scope of s 3(2) of the 1971 Act; (iii) that the rule changes defeated a legitimate expectation of a substantive kind, namely, that ILR would be granted, for each of them, after four years of continuous residence in the UK; (iv) that the knowledge requirement amounted to an unlawful act of direct or indirect facial discrimination under the Race Relations Act 1976; (v) that the knowledge requirement infringed their rights under arts 8 and 14 of, and art 1 of the First Protocol to, the European Convention on Human Rights, as set out under Sch 1 of Pt 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998; and (vi) that the Secretary of State should have used his prerogative power to exempt them from the more stringent requirements of the new rules.
Permission to apply for judicial review in respect of all the claimants would be granted. Their substantive applications would be dismissed.
The amendments made to para 134 of the Immigration Rules, which increased the period by which a work permit holder could become eligible to apply for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom from four years to five years, and which required an applicant to pass a test in respect of 'knowledge of life in the UK' in addition to the existing requirement for a 'sufficient understanding of English', were lawful.
In the instant case, none of the claimants' bases of challenge were made out. Neither of the rule changes had impaired an existing right or created a new obligation in regard to events that had already passed. As at the date of the changes, none of the claimants had had a right to be granted ILR in the light of the fact that in no single case had four years of continuous residence been achieved. In that event, the amended rules could not be criticised for having retrospective effect. Moreover, the introduction of the knowledge requirement could not be challenged on the ground that it had been based on a purpose of effecting 'social cohension' which was not within the scope of s 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. Further, there had been no explicit statement to any of the claimants that they would have become eligible to apply for ILR after residing for four years in the UK. In addition, no direct or indirect discrimination could be said to have been caused to the claimants under any of the provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976, and there had been no violations of the claimants' Convention rights. Finally, the Secretary of State could not be criticised for not having exercised his prerogative powers, given that none of the claimants had at the time of their applications, asked for such powers to be exercised, and in any event, the fact that the powers had not been exercised could not be regarded as Wednesbury unreasonable or perverse.
Accordingly, the Secretary of State's decision refusing ILR, in each case, would stand.
Robert Chan Barrister.
Published Date
18/12/2007